In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between …rms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the …ms are located in di¤erent countries. In this paper, we show that the relative number of …rms located in each country is also critical. In particular, we illustrate that with quantity competition and under the presence of demand and cost uncertainty information sharing does not occur when the number of …rms in one country is higher than the number of …rms in the other country. Moreover, we show that the informational prisoner's dilemma in the current context appears only when the number of …rms across countries is equal.
Introduction
In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) , hereafter CM, show that the standard assumption in the Brander-Spencer setting (see Brander and Spencer 1985) , which states that governments have complete information about the economy, is justi…ed when …rms compete over quantities.
However, the assumption of informed governments does not hold under Bertrand competition. This is because …rms have an incentive to disclose their private information regarding the exact demand and cost levels under Cournot competition, while they do not under price competition.
Thus, the governments remain uninformed in equilibrium. This result is founded on the fact that when the …rms reveal information to the government, they adjust their subsidies accordingly. This increases the variability of outputs and leads towards higher expected pro…ts and welfare levels.
The analysis of CM assumes that two …rms from two di¤erent countries compete in a third country market. When CM discuss possible extensions of their model in the summary section, they claim that the introduction of multiple …rms is expected to keep the results intact. "Consider, for example, what would occur if each country has multiple …rms.... If …rms compete in quantities, then government intervention will still increase the convexity of the pro…t function of each …rm, thereby inducing government learning in equilibrium," Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) , p. 239. 1 Within a framework that is essentially that of CM but appropriately modi…ed to deal with multiple …rms in each country, this paper shows that when …rms compete over quantities, the relative number of …rms in each country is a critical determinant of information sharing between the …rms and the governments. In particular, when two countries are asymmetric in terms of the number of …rms located in each of them, information disclosure will occur only in the country that subsidizes production, i.e., the country with relatively few …rms. In the rival country, the …rms will prefer to keep information private because the government implements an export tax. When there are several …rms, CM's model applies to both information sharing and the informational prisoner's dilemma in the special case of an equal number of …rms in each country. This argument aims to provide an explanation as to why some countries' …rms and governments share information and why others do not.
1 Emphasis in original.
The Model

Basic Assumptions
The bones of our model are those of CM; the departure is the consideration of multiple …rms in each country. The model features two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, that export a homogeneous good to a third market.The number of …rms in Countries 1 and 2 is exogenously given by n and m , respectively. 2 Total production by the n + m …rms is exported to the rest of the world. The linear inverse demand function of the homogeneous good is p = A P n i=1 q i P m j=1 Q j + where represents a shock in demand, which follows a distribution with zero mean and variance equal to var( ). We further assume that the …rms in Country 1 produce its goods with common constant marginal costs of (c i + u i ) for …rms in Country 1 and (c j + u j ) for …rms in country 2. The terms u i (common for the …rms in Country 1) and u j (common for the …rms in Country 2) are stochastic terms revealed to the …rms. They are independently distributed and follow a distribution with zero mean and, for simplicity, variances are equal to var(u i ) = var(u j ) = var(u) as in the original CM model. Country 1's government sets a subsidy (or a tax) s i > 0 (s i < 0) to maximize the domestic
, where i = p( )q i + s i q i denote the pro…ts of a typical …rm residing in that country. A similar game is played in Country 2.
Staging of the Game
In Stage 1 of the game, the …rms and governments simultaneously decide whether they will establish an agreement about sharing information or not. If they do, then we assume that no participant will break up the agreement because they will incur high costs for doing so. In Stage 2, nature de…nes the new values for the demand and/or the cost parameters and reveals them to the …rms. If the participants agreed in the …rst stage to share information, then the …rms reveal the updated statuses of demand and costs to the governments. In Stage 3, the two governments select an optimal policy of promoting or demoting exports through an export subsidy or export tax, respectively. Finally, in Stage 4, the …rms compete à la Cournot.
In order to determine the …nal outcome, we need to compute the expected values of pro…ts and welfare for each possible contingency and then compare the individual outcomes. Because the model evolves in four stages, we will solve it backwards.
Complete information
Here we assume that the governments and the …rms agree in Stage 1 to share information. In Stage 4 the …rms compete à la Cournot and thus outputs are the following: 3
The two governments determine the optimal policy by maximizing their national welfare, given the fourth stage outputs from the equation (1) . Therefore, we obtain:
and
The superscript cc over subsidy levels denotes that there is complete information in both countries, while BS denotes the Brander-Spencer outcomes when var(u) = var( ) = 0. Assuming that the demand intercept is su¢ ciently high to imply the existence of an interior solution, from (2), we observe that whether a government will set a subsidy or a tax depends on the number of …rms in the two countries. For instance, the government in Country 1 will set a subsidy (tax) if and only if n < m + 1 (n > m + 1). This means that a subsidy is imposed if the number of …rms in a country is less than or equal to the number of …rms residing in the rival country. Hence, if the number of …rms is equal across countries then a subsidy is implemented by both governments. The fact that the governments are informed by the …rms is re ‡ected by the policy levels, which adjust accordingly for the shocks , u i and u j .
Substituting the values given in (2) into (1) we obtain the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game. Next, we replace the equilibrium values into Country's 1 and 2 pro…t and welfare functions and taking expectations we get:
From (3) we observe that the expected pro…ts and welfare levels in both countries depend positively on var(u) and var( ). This is attributed to the convexity of the pro…t function with respect to the demand intercept and the marginal cost of production.
Incomplete information
When the …rms and the governments do not reach an agreement about information sharing in the …rst stage, then the governments act under incomplete information. Equilibrium outputs in the fourth stage are given again by (1) . What changes is the behavior of the governments in Stage 3
where they maximize the expected welfare levels. Hence, the equilibrium policy levels follow:
From (4) we observe that the subsidies in the case of the governments remaining uninformed (denoted by nn) equal the ones of the original Brander-Spencer setting with no uncertainty (see (2)). Substituting the values given in (4) into (1) we obtain the Bayes Nash Equilibrium of this game. Subsequently, we replace the equilibrium values into Country's 1 and 2 pro…t and welfare
Again, all of the expected values depend positively on var(u) and var( ) due to the convexity of the pro…t function with respect to , c i and c j .
The last scenario that must be examined before completing the full payo¤ matrix is the asymmetric case in which a pair, i.e., one government and a typical …rm, agrees to share information while the rival one, i.e., the other government and a typical …rm, does not. The calculations are trivial and thus for brevity they are relegated to the Appendix.
Results
Information Sharing Game
So far we have determined the expected values of pro…ts and welfare levels for the participants in the two countries for every possible contingency. Therefore, the full payo¤ matrices that the participants face in the …rst stage are now complete. The following Lemmas provide the optimal responses for every possible subcase both for a …rm and the government residing in Country 1:
Lemma 1 With unknown marginal cost of production: (a) For the government, it is a strictly dominant strategy to obtain information regardless of the number of …rms in the two countries. The driving forces behind this are straightforward. From (2) we observe that the government in Country 1 subsidizes the exporting …rms when n < m + 1. If n = m + 1; then the optimal policy is a zero subsidy. If n > m + 1; then the government implements an export tax. Assuming in the 4 The proof of Proposition 1 directly follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. Note also that the inequality conditions given here denote the necessary conditions. The su¢ cient condition for Country 1 in order to have information sharing is …rst scenario that a …rm reveals information then the government in Country 1 adjusts its policy according to the values of and u i . In particular, it follows from (2) that in good times (positive or negative u i ) the subsidy increases, while in bad times it decreases. This, in turn, increases convexity of the pro…t function leading to higher expected pro…ts and welfare levels. However, if n > m + 1; then good news forces the government to increase the tax, which translates into bad news for the …rm. In contrast, bad news leads to a reduction of the tax. Due to this governmental behavior, ‡exibility is reduced. Thus, expected pro…ts and welfare levels are now lower. In this case, the …rms prefer to keep their government uninformed. This result contrasts with CM's result that ignores the di¤erent number of …rms across countries.
Informational Prisoner' s Dilemma
In their study CM establish the existence of an informational prisoners dilemma with demand uncertainty and quantity competition. This means that although in equilibrium the …rms and the government in each country share information this is sub-optimal from the national welfare perspective. On the contrary, when a government is uncertain only with respect to the marginal cost of production, then the informational prisoner's dilemma disappears. In a multiple …rms setting, an informational prisoner's dilemma may occur only when, in equilibrium, the …rms and the governments agree to share information in both countries simultaneously. Given the analysis thus far, this holds only for the case where the number of the …rms in the two countries is equal, i.e., n = m. The following Proposition summarizes these arguments for the multiple …rms case:
Proposition 2 If n = m; then (a) with demand uncertainty, an informational prisoner's dilemma occurs and (b) with cost uncertainty, no informational prisoner's dilemma exists.
Proof in Appendix
Not surprisingly, CM's implications about the informational prisoner's dilemma are also obtained in the current multiple …rms framework, as long as we allow for the same number of …rms across the two countries. In the case of demand uncertainty, each government would prefer the rival pair not to share information, irrespective of what happens in that country regarding an agreement over information sharing. When the pair in Country 2 shares information about the exact value of , then the convexity of the pro…t function with respect to in Country 1 decreases and the reverse also occurs. Hence, information sharing in the two countries is undesirable.
The key feature in the case of demand uncertainty that leads to the informational prisoner's dilemma is that is common in both countries. If, however, there is uncertainty over the …rms' costs, then an informational prisoner's dilemma is not present in equilibrium as suggested in part (b) of Proposition 2. That is because the shocks in the two countries are not correlated. Now, if the …rms and the government in Country 2 agree over information sharing then any changes in u j increase the volatility of their outputs with respect to that shock. As a result, the convexity of the pro…t function for a typical …rm in Country 1 with respect to u j , and thus expected welfare in that country, increases with var(u). This paper has introduced multiple …rms in the framework of CM and has shown that when …rms compete over quantities, the number of …rms in the country is a critical determinant of information sharing between …rms and governments. Information sharing occurs in the case of multiple …rms, if the number of …rms in a country is less than or equal to the number of …rms in the rival country. This means that information sharing occurs as long as a government implements an export subsidy. Moreover, it is shown that for the special case where the number of …rms is equal in the two countries, the informational prisoner's dilemma still arises under demand uncertainty, while it does not under cost uncertainty.
The reader might wonder about extending this study to cover cases in which …rms compete in prices. This question is irrelevant because the addition of extra …rms in the model will not add anything. This is due to an export tax being the optimal policy for a government regardless of the number of …rms in the two countries (see Eaton and Grossman 1986 ; Section IV ).
This study is in line with CM and highlights instances where examining private information models in strategic trade policy might be an irrelevant issue because it is resolved endogenously under the conditions described here. This has the potential to open a new direction in the policy instrument choice literature. For example, Cooper and Riezman (1989) illustrated that subsidies might be preferred over quotas due to higher ‡exibility under uncertainty. Yet, if the problem of uncertainty is resolved, it is more than possible that quotas might gain back their advantage as a policy instrument over subsidies.
Appendix
Calculations of Subsidies and Expected Values for the Asymmetric Case:
Given Stage 4 equilibrium outputs (1) the policy levels are the following:
Here, the superscripts cn describe the situation in which the pair in Country 1 reach an agreement about information sharing and the pair in Country 2 does not, and nc the reverse. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
(a) Doing similar calculations with those of the previous Lemma, we get: If n < m + 1 and 4 + n(3 m + n) > 0 ,
